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Abstract 
It is common knowledge that in times of recession people lose confidence in the government 
and in other state institutions. Political scientists have pointed out that a loss of faith in a 
particular government or parliament does not necessarily amount to an erosion of civic culture 
as the cultural foundation of liberal democracy is broader. However, the recent recession has 
been unusually severe and long-lasting and some countries have only just started to climb out 
of it. It is an open question whether civic culture is so resilient that it can even weather 
exceptionally serious economic crises such as the recent one. As often happens in times of 
crisis, young people have been most affected by the recent crisis, and one may thus expect this 
age group to show the steepest drops in civic values. The current article examined the impact 
of the recession on the civic values of different generations across a selection of European and 
western states. Analyses of both short and long-term trends based on European Social Survey 
(ESS) and World Values Survey (WVS) data showed that social trust, tolerance, active civic 
participation and post-materialism values, as civic culture indicators, are not susceptible to 
economic downturns, confirming the idea that civic values need to be distinguished from 
political trust. Correlational analysis provided additional support for this finding as it showed 
no links between changes in civic culture indicators and changes in economic performance. 
However, civic dispositions were found to be related to overall levels of economic prosperity 
and performance, indicating that such dispositions are not wholly immune to material 
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conditions. This led us to surmise that civic culture is more susceptible to enduring processes 
affecting people’s life chances and well-being than to fleeting phenomena such as economic 
crises. 
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Introduction 
It is common knowledge that in times of recession people lose confidence in political 
institutions. Government and parliament are perceived as incapable of providing the necessary 
social protection and reviving the economy. People express their discontent by taking to the 
street to protest against austerity measures or tax increases. The introductory article to this 
special issue has documented these trends for the 2008 crisis, which hit Europe very badly. It 
showed that political trust has declined markedly in most countries, and particularly so in the 
countries most affected by the crisis. These same countries have also seen a surge in protest 
activities including demonstrations and occupations.  
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The question this raises is whether public discontent with politics in times of crisis spills over 
into civic values more broadly. Are people not only losing faith in political institutions but also 
withdrawing their support for the values and attitudes that are often associated with liberal 
democracies, such as tolerance, human rights, freedom of speech and social trust? If this is the 
case, economic crises like the recent one can pose a real danger for the stability and survival of 
democracy.  
On the one hand, there are indications that economic crises do have these wider effects. 
Thomassen (1990), for instance, notes that the stagflation of the 1970s was seen a major threat 
to the stability of western democracies in many popular accounts at the time. Others point to 
the propensity of xenophobia to rise in times of crisis, expressed politically as support for 
populist parties with anti-immigrant agendas and a propensity to scapegoat particular social or 
ethnic groups (Ibarra 2011). Academic support for the idea that economic downturns pose a 
threat to democracy comes from Inglehart and Welzel (2005). They maintain that in times of 
crisis people deem economic and physical security to be more important than lofty values such 
as democracy, human rights and social justice. In austere times they might therefore be less 
motivated to oppose political movements seeking to abolish democracy. 
Others, on the other hand, have argued that a loss of confidence in the institutions of democracy 
does not necessarily amount to a declining legitimacy of democracy and an erosion of civic 
values (Finkel et al 1989; Klingemann 1999). They note that since the 1960s a new group of 
citizens emerged combining a sceptical attitude towards authority and power hierarchies with 
ardent support for human rights and democracy. If political distrust is a manifestation of this 
sceptical attitude, then declining political trust can easily go together with stable or rising 
support for civic values and democracy as system of government. Indeed, critical citizens are 
praised by some for their inclination to hold politicians accountable and keep democratically 
elected governments responsive (Gamson 1968; Kymlicka 2002). According to Lipset (1959), 
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established democracies, even if they do not perform well in times of crisis, usually survive 
economic storms by maintaining high levels of public legitimacy. In his view, only when both 
performance and legitimacy have declined dramatically is democracy seriously at risk. 
However, the recent recession has been unusually severe and long-lasting for many countries 
(Balcerowicz et al. 2013), and some countries are still experiencing economic contraction. 
Although the United Kingdom has now climbed out of the recession, only 55 months after the 
start of the crisis did its economy attain pre-crisis levels (see Figure 1), and real wages are not 
expected to reach 2008 levels before 2018. The figure shows that the current crisis is not as 
deep as the one in the 1930s, but the recovery has been much slower. It is an open question 
whether support for civic values is so resilient that it can even weather exceptionally serious 
economic crises such as the most recent one.  
Moreover, crises do not affect everyone equally. The current crisis is no different from previous 
ones in that young people take the brunt. Many observers have expressed concerns about the 
socio-political consequences of the disproportionate impact of the crisis on young people (e.g. 
Pilkington and Pollock 2015; Williamson 2014). Williamson (2014), for instance, speculates 
that young people’s reaction can take any form, ranging from radicalization to concerted 
political mobilization within the bounds of the law.  
There is however huge variation across states in the degree to which young people are affected, 
even among states hit hardest by crisis. Among the latter we find for instance states such as the 
Netherlands, Slovenia and Ireland with quite moderate young unemployment figures (hovering 
around 10 to 13 per cent) and states where these figures exceed 40 per cent (Greece, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain) (Eurostat 2013). As the young have suffered disproportionately in the crisis 
one would expect this age group to show the steepest falls in support for civic values and 
democracy. If these outcomes have indeed been affected by the recent crisis, the falls should 
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be most pronounced in countries where young people have been hit particularly hard. Previous 
research has shown that young people in the countries most affected by the crisis (i.e. Southern 
Europe) have certainly not become more apathetic or alienated as their levels of protest have 
soured (Simsa 2015). This might be interpreted as a preliminary positive sign that they have 
not abandoned faith in legitimate democratic means of political mobilization.  
 
Figure 1: Crisis and recovery in the United Kingdom. 
 
 
 
The current article will explore the resilience of civic values by analysing trends across birth 
cohorts in a select group of countries and by relating young people’s civic attitudes to indices 
of economic performance. Use is made of survey data from the European Social Survey (ESS), 
rounds 2002 to 2012, to assess short term trends in civic outcomes. As this survey runs every 
two years, it allows us to establish more precisely when rises or falls in these outcomes occur. 
6 
 
Data from the World Values Survey (WVS), years 1981 to 2010–2013, are used to explore 
developments over the longer term, enabling us to see how the 1980–2000 birth cohort in 2010–
2013 compares to older cohorts at some point in the past when they were of the same age as 
the 1980–2000 cohort. It also gives us some clues to assess whether the most recent crisis has 
had more profound effects on civic outcomes than earlier crises, such as those of the early 
1980s and 1990s. ESS includes people aged 15 and older (no upper limit), while WVS sampled 
people between ages 18 and 85. 
The trends will be presented by birth cohort (1880–1944; 1945–1959; 1960–1979; 1980–2000) 
in individual countries. These cohorts correspond closely to familiar generational 
characterizations, such as the Traditionalists, the Baby-Boomers, Generation X and the 
Millenials. Because of this presentation by cohort a word of caution is warranted regarding the 
number of respondents in each of the groups. Although both surveys are nationally 
representative with country samples for each round ranging between 990 and 4000 respondents 
for the WVS and between 1600 and 3000 respondents for the ESS, numbers drop when split-
ups are made by birth cohort. This is especially a problem in Round 1999–2004 of the WVS 
for the youngest birth cohort (1980–2000) as sample sizes fall below 100 respondents for this 
group in a number of countries.
1 In all the other groups the sample is larger than 100 however. For the ESS the problem is less 
acute as each birth cohort is represented by at least 200 respondents in each country in each of 
the rounds. Because of the poor representation of the youngest cohort in the aforementioned 
WVS round, we will be cautious in making bold statements about long-term trends for this 
group.   
We will explore these trends for only a limited set of countries, namely the United Kingdom, 
the United States, Spain, Germany, Sweden and Poland, so as to not overwhelm the reader with 
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data. We selected these countries for three reasons. First, each of these states can be said to be 
a typical representative of a certain welfare regime (e.g. Esping Andersen 1990). A country’s 
welfare regime is relevant as it reflects the degree of social protection offered to citizens who 
become unemployed during a recession. In the United Kingdom and the United States, 
countries with a liberal welfare regime, individuals are more exposed to the vagaries of the 
market economy than in countries with a social-democratic regime, such as Sweden, where the 
unemployed, irrespective of their employment history, enjoy relatively lavish benefits (Esping 
Andersen 1990; Green and Janmaat 2011). In countries with a traditional regime, such as Spain, 
the family plays an important role in mitigating the social upheaval of market economy 
turbulences. In Germany, a country said to exhibit a conservative regime, benefits depend on 
employment history and last earned salary. Unemployment could thus have particularly 
dramatic consequences for those who have never worked before or who worked in low-paid 
jobs, as is the case for many young people. Poland represents a post-communist country with 
a welfare state blending features of both the conservative and liberal model (Staręga-Piasek et 
al. 2006), thus offering relatively little protection for young people who lose their jobs. As in 
Spain, the family can be expected to play an important role in absorbing the fall-out of the 
crisis. One could imagine that young people respond more extremely to economic shocks 
where the safety net is marginal. Consequently one might expect the most dramatic falls in 
civic values to have occurred in the United Kingdom and the United States, and to a lesser 
extent in Poland, Spain and Germany. 
Secondly, the six countries were selected because they represent a range of fortunes with 
respect to the recent crisis. At the extremes of this range are Spain and Germany (see Table 1). 
While Spain experienced a dramatic contraction in its economy and a surge in youth 
unemployment from an already markedly high pre-crisis level, Germany was hardly affected 
by the crisis neither macro-economically nor specifically regarding youth unemployment. The 
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other countries are located in the middle of the continuum with the United Kingdom being 
closer to the Spanish end and Sweden and Poland being more similar to Germany. The latter 
two countries are interesting as they show good macro-economic performance, in terms of 
change in GDP per capita from 2008 to 2012, in combination with rising youth unemployment, 
recording increases of 12.7 and 10.5 per cent, respectively, over the same period. This suggests 
that the economic crisis has had a different impact on different generations in these countries. 
Thus, if civic values were solely influenced by economic conditions, one would expect Spain 
to witness sharp falls in civic mindedness, Germany not to show any decline and Sweden and 
Poland to register diverging responses among different generations with young people showing 
the most salient declines. 
The third reason is more pragmatic as it relates to the data available in the WVS. Spain, 
Sweden, Germany and the United States happen to be the only countries that have participated 
in all waves. We used the United States as a stand in for the United Kingdom in view of the 
absence of the latter in the last wave. 
 
Table 1: Economic performance of selected countries during the crisis. 
 
 Change in GDP per 
capita 2008–2012 
(%) 
Youth 
unemployment rate 
August 2008 
Change in youth 
unemployment 
August 2008–
August 2012 
Germany 3.8 10.0 2.0 
Poland 12.5 16.2 10.5 
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Spain 7.4 25.0 29.4 
Sweden 3.4 10.2 12.7 
United Kingdom 4.1 15.4 5.2 
 
Sources: Eurostat (2015) for youth unemployment; Balcerowicz et al. (2013) for GDP per 
capita. 
 
The outcomes we focus on include social trust, tolerance, active civic participation and post-
materialist values. Most of these qualities have been identified as key components of civic 
culture by different authors (Almond and Verba 1963; Galston 1991; Putnam 1993; Inglehart 
and Welzel 2005). Although these scholars have different understandings of civic culture and 
consequently assign different characteristics to it, they are in agreement in seeing this culture 
as a sine qua non for democracy. In other words, even with all the proper institutions in place, 
a democracy will not function well and will not be durable if it is not supported by civically 
minded citizens. Thus, the relevance of the aforementioned qualities lies in sustaining the 
cultural foundation of democracy.  
We start by examining trends in civic outcomes across cohorts for the select group of 
countries.2 The second section we correlate these outcomes with cumulated changes in GDP 
per capita and youth unemployment levels.  
 
Trends by birth cohort and age group 
Social trust 
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We begin our survey of trends with social trust, which we understand as trust in people in 
general, including strangers. In contrast to political trust, which is volatile and dependent on 
the degree of identification with the parties in power, social trust is fairly stable and is mostly 
a reflection of one’s own social position and that of one’s parents (Newton 1999). Unlike 
political trust, it is formed early in life through parental upbringing (Uslaner 2002). Social trust 
has been associated with a variety of societal benefits including economic growth (Knack and 
Keefer 1997), better government (Putnam 2000), and well-being and happiness (Wilkinson and 
Pickett 2009). For this reason it is often used as a key indicator of overall social cohesion (e.g. 
Green and Janmaat 2011). Many scholars have also stressed its vital importance for democracy 
(e.g. Ostrom 1990; Fukuyama 1995). Social trust enables cooperation between people of 
different backgrounds and their interest organizations, including political parties, unions and 
churches, which is a key characteristic of liberal democracy (Newton 1999). Without it 
democracy is likely to disintegrate as a result of escalating conflicts between different social 
groups. ESS tapped social trust with the item ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most 
people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’ Response 
categories represent a scale ranging from 0=‘you can’t be too careful’ to 10=‘most people can 
be trusted’. WVS used the same wording but offered respondents no more than a binary choice 
between these two options. 
 
Figure 2: Short term trends in social trust by cohort in selected European countries. 
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Source: ESS. 
Note: The figure shows mean levels of trust on an 11 point scale ranging between 0=‘you can’t 
be too careful’ and 10=‘most people can be trusted’. 
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Looking at how social trust has developed from the early 2000s amongst four birth cohorts in 
selected European states, we cannot see any clear cross-national patterns (see Figure 2). Trends 
appear to be country-specific, with trust rising steeply amongst all cohorts in Germany from 
2010 and declining amongst all cohorts in Poland and Sweden. There does not seem to be a 
connection with the economic crisis as trust has not fallen in countries hit hardest by the crisis 
(Spain) or amongst cohorts most affected by it, such as young people. In fact, in a country like 
Spain with a youth unemployment of over 50 per cent in August 2013 (Eurostat 2013) the 
youngest cohort shows both the highest level of trust of all cohorts and a rise in trust since the 
onset of the crisis. In the United Kingdom by contrast trust is lowest among the youngest 
generation. Since the onset of the crisis, the different generations appear to have drifted apart 
with the old becoming more and the young becoming less trusting. Interestingly this diverging 
pattern shows up in the United Kingdom and not in Sweden and Poland, where we would have 
expected it given the distinct combination of good overall economic performance with rising 
hardship for young people that characterizes these countries. Although the trends in the United 
Kingdom are not dramatic in absolute terms (as the observed changes are only minor on a scale 
from 0 to 10), they do suggest that social trust can change later in life due to changing 
circumstances. Hence, it would not be correct to claim that social trust takes on a definite form 
in early childhood.  
 
Figure 3: Long-term trends in social trust by birth cohort in selected western countries.  
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Source: WVS. 
Note: The figure shows the percentage saying that most people can be trusted. 
 
Country-specific trends also predominate when we look at long-term trends (see Figure 3). 
While social trust has gone up in Germany, declining trends can be observed in Spain over the 
last three decades. These trends are visible among all generations, albeit with some 
fluctuations. It is tempting to draw a link with the diverging economic fortunes of the two 
countries since the onset of the crisis, but if we take a closer look at the trends in Spain we see 
that the fall in trust was most pronounced from the late 1990s to the mid-2000s when the 
country was experiencing a period of sustained economic growth. Thus, as was the case for the 
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short term trends, there does not seem to be a connection with periods of economic contraction. 
Spain and Germany do have in common that the younger generations are more trusting than 
the older ones. In this they contrast markedly with Sweden and the United States where the 
youngest cohort shows the lowest level of trust towards the end of the time series. Another 
difference is that in the latter two countries trends do differ by generation: while trust has gone 
up in the oldest cohort in both countries, it stabilized (United States) or declined sharply 
(Sweden) in the youngest cohort. So looking over a longer period of time, we do see the 
expected trend in Sweden of generations drifting apart in levels of social trust. 
 
Tolerance 
Tolerating people who differ from oneself in important ways is generally considered to be a 
key liberal democratic virtue (Putnam 1993). If there is no respect for people of different 
backgrounds and with different interest, it is difficult to see how conflicts can be resolved in a 
peaceful democratic way. However, tolerance is also seen as an attitude that is quite susceptible 
to economic crises. Under conditions of scarcity and increasing competition for jobs, people 
often become more exclusionary and hostile towards out-groups such as immigrants, to the 
point of blaming them for all the problems in society including rising unemployment among 
the native population (van Beek and Vnuk-Lipinski 2011). Indeed, it appears to be rising anti-
immigrant sentiment that is driving the current electoral successes of populist parties (Caviedes 
2010; Downs 2012). In ESS we selected the item ‘Is [country] made a worse or a better place 
to live by people coming to live here from other countries?’ as a measure of ethnic tolerance. 
The answer categories represent an 11 point scale ranging between 0=‘worse place to live’ to 
10=‘better place to live’. In WVS we used the question asking respondents to mention groups 
they would not like to have as neighbours (0=not mentioned; 1=mentioned). We selected the 
group ‘immigrants/foreign workers’ and used the percentage not mentioning this group as an 
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indicator of ethnic tolerance. Because of these different items the comparisons between short 
and long-term trends need to be read with caution. 
 
Figure 4: Short term trends in ethnic tolerance by birth cohort in selected European countries. 
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Source: ESS. 
 
Note: The figure shows mean levels of ethnic tolerance. The means are based on the 11 point 
scale referred to above. 
 
Contrary to expectation people appear not to have become more negative in their views on 
immigrants since the onset of the crisis in 2008 (Figure 4). In fact tolerant attitudes towards 
immigrants have risen among all birth cohorts in four of the five selected countries, including 
crisis-afflicted Spain. Only in Poland do we see a levelling off of tolerance from 2008 onwards 
after a steady rise from the early 2000s. Interestingly we see a diverging pattern in this country 
but not the one we would have expected: while the youngest generation becomes more positive, 
the oldest generation grows more negative in their views on immigrants. In sum, the regularity 
that anti-immigrant sentiment thrives in periods of recession is not borne out at all by these 
trends. It is further revealing that the youngest cohort is the most tolerant and shows one of the 
highest growth figures in the United Kingdom, Spain, Germany and Poland. Thus, the 
generation that suffered most from the economic crisis is not only most welcoming in their 
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attitudes towards immigrants but is also becoming increasingly tolerant, again defying the logic 
that scarcity breeds hostility. 
 
Figure 5: Long-term trends in ethnic tolerance by birth cohort in selected western countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: WVS. 
 
Note: the figure shows the percentage not mentioning immigrants/foreign workers as unwanted 
neighbours. 
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The long-term trends do not tally with the short term ones. Instead of a rise in tolerance we see 
a downward trend in the United States and in Germany from the end of the 1990s to the present 
(Figure 5). In Sweden tolerance has risen until the mid-2000s3 after which point it declined, 
particularly amongst the young, mimicking the long-term trend in social trust. In Spain the 
trend lines are different again with tolerance reaching an all-time low at the end of the 1990s 
and showing a slight recovery since then. In this country the youngest generation has the 
highest level of tolerance and it is the only group showing an increase in tolerance from the 
mid-2000s. In short, country-specific trends predominate when looking at tolerance in the 
longer term. The link with economic scarcity is as good as non-existent as the group and the 
country that have suffered most from the crisis (i.e. the young in Spain) show an increase in 
tolerance. By contrast, tolerance has declined markedly amongst all generations in Germany, 
which has hardly been touched by the crisis Finally, it needs to be noted that the contrasting 
results on the ESS (short term) and WVS (long term) measures of tolerance are a sobering 
reminder that similar patterns cannot be guaranteed when looking at different items that 
seemingly measure the same latent construct. 
 
Active civic participation 
Civic associations are seen as a key feature of civic culture in many classic accounts of this 
phenomenon (e.g. de Tocqueville 1969; Almond and Verba 1963). They are considered to be 
crucial for the consolidation of democracy, not only because they socialize individual members 
in democratic qualities and dispositions such as trust, tolerance, moderation, cooperation and 
public spiritedness, but also because they function as a check on state power and provide 
channels of coordinated interest articulation which are vital for politicians to keep in touch with 
society (Putnam 1993; Fox 2000; Ishkanian 2007). In other words, they discipline their 
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members internally and policy-makers externally. Following Hoskins et al. (2006: 10) we 
understand active civic participation as ‘Participation in civil society, community and/or 
political life, characterized by mutual respect and non-violence and in accordance with human 
rights and democracy’. 
To assess short term trends in this outcome we relied on the following ESS question: 
‘There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent things from 
going wrong. During the last twelve months, have you done any of the following?’ (1) ‘worked 
in a political party or action group’; (2) ‘worked in another organisation or association’. The 
question did not give other options. We developed a measure of civic participation by 
combining the responses to these two items. The measure has two values: 0 – not worked in 
any of these organizations; 1 – worked in one or more of these organizations. An equivalent 
measure could not be constructed for the long-term trends as the WVS asked about active civic 
participation in a different way. To match the ESS-based measure as closely as possible we 
selected the question asking respondents whether they were a passive or active member of the 
following organizations: church, union, political party, environmental organization, 
professional organization, humanitarian or charitable organization. We used this question to 
create a long-term measure of active civic participation with two values (analogous to the short 
term measure): 0 – not an active member in any of these organizations; 1 – active member in 
one or more of these organizations. Again, because of the different wording, we are cautious 
in comparing the short with the long-term trends. 
 
Figure 6: Short term trends in active civic participation in selected European countries. 
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Source: ESS. 
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Note: The figure shows the percentage saying they have worked for one or more organizations 
over the last twelve months. 
 
In accordance with the trends in trust and tolerance, active involvement in civic associations 
appears not to have been affected by the economic crisis either (Figure 6). Although levels of 
involvement go down in Germany and the United Kingdom in the initial years of the crisis, this 
decline is more than compensated for by the rise from 2010 to 2012. In the other three countries 
we see participation actually rising from the beginning of the crisis in all generations, with the 
exception of the baby boom cohort in Poland. Once again, country-unique trends predominate. 
While Germany shows a marked rise in active participation among all cohorts over the whole 
ten-year period, the United Kingdom demonstrates a steady decline from 2002 to 2010 and a 
small recovery thereafter. A remarkable V pattern can be observed in Spain, with participation 
declining spectacularly from 2004 to 2008 and rising equally miraculously thereafter. In 
Sweden, we see a diverging pattern in line with our expectation: while participation goes up in 
the older cohorts, and spectacularly so amongst the oldest group, it stabilizes amongst the 
youngest cohort. Remarkably, a converging trend can be observed in Poland, which obviously 
is not what we expected to find. Also in terms of levels of participation the differences between 
the countries are conspicuous. The United Kingdom and Poland, for instance, show 
permanently lower levels than Germany, Spain and Sweden for all cohorts. In the United 
Kingdom and in Sweden the youngest generation consistently has the lowest levels of 
participation while in Germany, Poland and Spain the oldest generation is least involved. 
 
Figure 7: Long-term trends in active civic participation in Spain and West Germany. 
 
22 
 
 
 
Source: WVS. 
 
Note: The figure shows the percentage of respondents saying they have been an active member 
of one or more organizations. 
 
Unfortunately the WVS data on long-term trends in active civic participation were only 
available for two countries and for three points in time. Looking at these trends, we see a steady 
decline among the older generations in Spain from the mid-1990s onwards (see Figure 7). In 
West Germany the trends are more unstable but there too participation seems to be declining 
among the older generations while rising among the younger ones. These developments are 
quite different from the short term trends, which obviously is likely to be related to the 
difference in measurement. As the measure of long-term trends is mainly based on involvement 
in traditional organizations, such as the church, unions and political parties, the decline in Spain 
may reflect a change in the kind of organizations people are willing to be actively involved in 
rather than a decline in active participation as such. This interpretation is supported by the fact 
that this decline is mainly due to falling levels of church involvement among the older cohorts.4 
The trends in Spain could thus simply reflect secularization. This reading of the results is 
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further backed up by the remarkably low levels of involvement of the youngest generation in 
both countries. Presumably, young people are the least enthusiastic about participating in 
traditional organizations and therefore most likely to participate in alternative ways (e.g. 
through online and social media activities). Whatever the explanation for these trends, they 
once again show no particular connection with the economic crisis: in Spain participation 
actually rises slightly amongst the youngest and oldest cohorts from the mid-2000s onwards 
while the same thing happens in Germany among three of the four cohorts.   
 
Post-materialism 
We conclude the review of trends with a discussion of developments in post-materialist values. 
As coined by Inglehart (1990), the term refers to notions of personal autonomy and self-
fulfilment. People with a post-materialist frame of mind not only value individual autonomy, 
they also cherish quality of life, having a say in matters, care for the environment and equal 
treatment of and respect for all social groups. People with materialist values, in contrast, value 
economic and physical security and care less about upholding civic norms such as participation, 
equal treatment and tolerance. The materialist-post-materialist values continuum bears 
resemblance to Maslow’s (1943) pyramid of needs with materialist values referring to basic 
needs and post-materialist values representing the ‘higher order’ need of self-actualization. 
Inglehart and Welzel (2005: 192) considered post-materialist values to be a necessary 
ingredient of an effective democracy, i.e. a democracy in which formal civic and political rights 
are respected and lived up to by political elites in actual practice. In their view, the young tend 
to have stronger post-materialist values than older people since they grew up under safer and 
more prosperous conditions than older generations. They also claim that levels of post-
materialism go down in all age groups during times of economic contraction. We measured 
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post-materialist values with the ready-made materialism-post-materialism index provided by 
the WVS. This index is based on the following items: 
 
‘If you had to choose among the following things, which are the two that seem the most 
desirable to you?’ 
 Maintaining order in the nation. 
 Giving people more say in important political decisions. 
 Fighting rising prices. 
 Protecting freedom of speech. 
 
While the first and the third option tap materialism, the second and the fourth ones capture 
post-materialist values. The index has three values: 1=materialist values; 2=mixed; 3=post-
materialist values. As no comparable items can be found in ESS we only present long-term 
trends. 
 
Figure 8: Long-term trends in post-materialist values by birth cohort in selected western 
countries. 
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Source: WVS. 
 
Note: The figure shows mean values on the materialism-post-materialism scale. This scale 
ranges between 1 (materialism) and 3 (post-materialism). 
 
Trends in post-materialist values mimic those on the other three indicators of civic culture. 
Again we see no particular link with austerity as post-materialism was mostly stable or rose 
slightly from 2008 to 2013 in most cohorts in the four countries (see Figure 8). Remarkably, 
during this period it increased among the youngest generation in Spain while it decreased 
somewhat among the older ones in this country. Had the economic crisis had an effect on post-
materialism, as claimed by Inglehart and Welzel, we should have surely seen the reverse 
pattern. Once more the developments appear to be particular to each country. While Sweden 
witnesses a steady rise in post-materialism in all cohorts from the early 1980s onwards, 
Germany shows a fluctuating pattern with a dip in the early 2000s. Post-materialism peaked in 
Spain in the mid-1990s after which a small but steady decline set it. Interestingly we find quite 
contracting trends across birth cohorts in the United States. While post-materialism has risen 
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amongst the oldest cohort, to such an extent that this cohort changes from the one with the 
lowest to the one with the highest level of post-materialism, it declines among the two youngest 
cohorts to an all-time low in 2013. Thus, in the United States we see a marked reversal of the 
regularity that younger generations are always more post-materialistically minded than older 
generations. 
 
Summing up the trends on the four indicators of civic culture we cannot conclude that the 
economic crisis has had any particularly negative effect on the cultural foundations of 
democracy. Developments appeared to be quite country-specific suggesting that local 
conditions were more important in influencing civic values and behaviours than global 
processes. In a sense this is reassuring news. Apparently, civic culture is able to weather 
economic storms, even when they turn into hurricanes such as the most recent economic crisis. 
Yet, we also see trends that give us some cause for concern. The two youngest cohorts in the 
United States show quite a pronounced decline in post-materialism, which predates the 2008 
crisis. This might indicate that other more enduring processes such as the rising cost of housing 
and education and ever higher levels of indebtedness have more of an impact on young people 
than the recent economic contraction. 
 
The link between economic performance and civic attitudes 
 
In this section we focus on the youngest birth cohort (1980–2000) and examine whether their 
civic values and behaviours are related to youth unemployment and GDP per capita as indices 
of economic performance. We correlate these indices with aggregate levels of civic dispositions 
amongst this cohort. These correlations are based on all the countries participating in the 2008 
and 2012 rounds of ESS for which there are relevant data. We used the same indicators of civic 
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dispositions as before. We also assessed relationships with aggregate levels of political trust to 
see whether civic dispositions are related in the same way to economic performance as political 
trust.5 Unfortunately we could not use WVS data due insufficient European countries 
participating in the last wave. We therefore omitted post-materiast values. We first examine 
the links between levels of civic dispositions and economic performance and proceed by 
examining whether changes in these dispositions are related to changes in economic 
performance. 
 
Table 2: The link between economic performance and young people’s civic attitudes and 
behaviours. 
 
                        Youth unemployment  GDP pc PPP 2012–2013 
             rate (August 2012)       
 Pearson’s r N Pearson’s r N 
Political trust 2012 0.63*** 19 0.87*** 22 
Social trust 2012 0.46** 19 0.74*** 22 
Tolerance 2012 0.29 19 0.38* 22 
Active civic participation 2012 0.41* 19 0.70*** 22 
 
* p=0.1; ** p=0.05; *** p=0.01 
 
Sources: 
For youth unemployment, see Eurostat (2015). 
For GDP pc PPP, see World Bank (2005). 
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The review of trends in the first section of this article did not find much evidence of the recent 
economic crisis having affected civic culture. However, this review was based on a small 
selection of countries. Can any link with the economy be found when we expand the number 
of countries and run the correlations described above? Table 2 shows that civic culture is in 
fact not as immune to economic conditions as one might be led to believe based on the review 
of trends. We see that social trust, ethnic tolerance and active civic participation, as the three 
civic culture indicators, are linked in precisely the same way to the two indicators of economic 
performance as political trust: the lower a country’s level of youth unemployment and the 
higher its level of prosperity, the higher the levels of civic culture among its younger citizens. 
Although these links are not as strong as those for political trust, judging from the coefficients 
and the significance levels, they nonetheless suggest that civic culture is at least partly 
dependent on material conditions. The very strong correlations of political trust with the two 
indicators of economic performance confirm the idea that political trust is highly responsive to 
the state of the economy.  
 It would be premature, however, to conclude that the economic crisis must have thus 
led to a drop in civic dispositions among young people as these dispositions may have been 
low at the onset in the countries most affected by the crisis. We therefore took the pre-crisis 
levels into account and examined whether changes in economic performance were correlated 
with changes in civic attitudes between 2008 and 2012 (see Table 3). The table shows the 
expected patterns for political trust: countries experiencing the sharpest rise in youth 
unemployment rates and the most dramatic contraction of the economy also witnessed the 
sharpest declines in political trust over the 2008–2012 period. Political trust is therefore highly 
dependent on both levels of and changes in economic conditions. Interestingly, deteriorating 
economic conditions did not have the same effect on civic dispositions. Apart from a weak 
negative impact on ethnic tolerance, they did not diminish levels of social trust and active civic 
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participation. In other words, countries worst affected by the crisis have not experienced 
significantly sharper declines (or significantly lower increases) in trust and participation than 
countries least affected by the crisis.   
 In sum, while civic dispositions do not appear to be affected by changing economic 
conditions, they are dependent on the overall level of prosperity. How can this paradox be 
explained? Possibly, civic dispositions only start falling several years after the onset of an 
economic crisis. They may therefore not yet have declined in 2012, which is four years after 
the beginning of the most recent crisis and the latest year that we have survey data on. This 
would explain why we did not find a relation between changes in civic dispositions and depth 
of the economic contraction since 2008, while we did nonetheless find civic dispositions to be 
broadly dependent on material conditions. If this conjecture is true, civic dispositions should 
fall as the crisis continues.  
 
Table 3: The link between changes in economic performance and changes in young people’s 
civic attitudes and behaviours. 
 
                                Change in youth 
          unemployment         Change in 
                     Aug 2008 – Aug 2012    GDP pc 2008–2012 
 Pearson’s r N Pearson’s r N 
Changes in political trust 2008–2012 0.74*** 17 0.71*** 16 
Changes in social trust 2008–2012 0.20 17 0.30 16 
Changes in tolerance 2008–2012 0.41* 17 0.44* 16 
Changes in active civic participation 2008–
2012 
0.35 17 0.13 16 
* p=0.1; ** p=0.05; *** p=0.01 
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Sources: 
For the change in youth unemployment, see Eurostat (2015). 
For the change in GDP pc, see Balcerowicz et al. (2013). 
 
Conclusion 
This article sought to investigate the impact of the recent recession on the civic dispositions of 
various age groups in western countries. It was hypothesized that the civic dispositions of 
young people might have been particularly affected as economic crises are usually 
disproportionately hitting the young. We found, however, that young people’s civic 
dispositions have endured the recent years of economic adversity much better than their trust 
in political institutions. While young people’s political trust responded immediately to the 
contraction by showing the greatest declines in countries most affected by the crisis, a similar 
pattern could not be observed for their civic dispositions, as changes in social trust and active 
civic participation were not related to changes in economic performance. Trend analyses 
confirmed this conclusion. Generally, trends in civic dispositions showed no connection with 
periods of economic contraction. Social trust, ethnic tolerance and post-materialist values 
actually rose during the most recent economic crisis in a country (Spain) and a group (the 
young) most severely afflicted by the crisis. Country-specific developments predominated, 
suggesting that civic culture is more dependent on local conditions. 
 At first sight this conclusion is reassuring. Apparently, civic culture is able to resist 
economic storms notwithstanding dramatic falls in public confidence in the institutions of 
government. Thus, the cultural foundations of democracy seem to be as solid as before, 
suggesting that democratic rule in western countries is stable and sound. However, we also 
found civic dispositions to be related to overall levels of economic prosperity and performance, 
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indicating that such dispositions are not wholly immune to material conditions. Possibly civic 
culture is responding to economic contraction but only after some time. If true, we should see 
civic culture eroding in countries where the current crisis deepens such as in Greece and Italy. 
The next wave of the ESS and WVS should be able to give us more definite answers to this 
question. Our findings, in fact, closely correspond to those of Basora (2013), who found no 
evidence of democracy itself being affected by the crisis in most European countries. He 
speculated however, as we do, that a prolonged crisis may well undermine the public legitimacy 
of democracy, even in states with consolidated democracies. 
The above conjecture also gives rise to the proposition that civic culture is more 
susceptible to enduring processes affecting people’s life chances and well-being than to fleeting 
phenomena such as economic crises. Some of our trend data offer provisional support for this 
proposition. We saw that social trust already started declining among young people in Britain 
before the 2008 crisis. Similarly the two youngest cohorts in the United States witnessed quite 
a pronounced fall in post-materialist values from the early 2000s. In both countries the material 
conditions and opportunities of young people are under ever greater pressure due to the steady 
rise in the cost of housing and education and the growing levels of indebtedness, processes 
which started at the end of the 1990s. It might therefore be more productive to assess what such 
more enduring processes do to the cultural foundations of democracy than economic crises.  
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Notes 
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1 A table showing the number of respondents in each of the birth cohorts by survey, country 
and round can be obtained from the author upon request. 
2 These trends will be presented as a series of graphs, which enables a quick and easy 
determination of the main developments. The full statistics of the trends, including means, 
confidence intervals and significance levels can be obtained from the author upon request. 
3 This interpretation needs to be stated with caution due to the low numbers of respondents in 
the youngest cohort in the 1999–2004 round. 
4 The author will provide these results upon request. 
5 We measured political trust with an ESS item on confidence in parliament. The response 
categories of this item are (1) none at all, (2) not very much, (3) quite a lot and (4) a great 
deal. 
                                                          
